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Abstract: This article statistically estimates the impact of different countries’ soft
power on the results of Olympic Games bidding in the post-Cold War era. All
bid results for the Olympic Summer and Winter Games between 1990 and 2011
are analyzed by panel regression methods. The empirical results reveal that sport-
ing success, higher transparency, lower CO2 and particle emissions, and faster
economic growth are likely to increase the probability of a bidding country 
winning an Olympic bid. These results have several implications regarding the
impact of soft power on choice of Olympic host site. First, if a country has a
high number of Olympic gold medalists, this could attract International Olympic
Committee (IOC) members and influence their decisions. Second, a country’s
ethical reputation is likely to persuade the IOC to choose it as the rightful host
country. Third, the environmental record of a country may also be regarded as a
desirable value by IOC members, who prefer a ‘Green Games’ ecological legacy.
Keywords: soft power, Olympic Games, bidding, sports diplomacy, panel
regression analysis
INTRODUCTION
Countries compete with one another in order to secure limited resources. As human
civilization has evolved from simple systems to complex ones, many countries have
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risen and fallen as a consequence of international competition. In ancient times, powerful
military empires established colonies all over the world, whereas contemporary
“empires” in the globalization era exploit underdeveloped followers with “invisible
hands”. How does one country defeat another in the global survival game? Although
“hard power,” wielded through either inducements or threats, is still essential for the
survival of the fittest in the arena of traditional security and military order, recent
social and environmental changes in global competition (such as interest in quality of
life or climate change) seem to raise the importance of “soft power,” which Nye
(2004, p. 10) defined as “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than
coercion or payments.” While there is a voluminous academic and policy literature on
soft power, this topic is theoretically underspecified (Sohn, 2011), and little empirical
or quantitative research has been conducted into how and to what extent soft power
influences international relations in global competition. Does soft power matter at all,
or is it simply “much ado about nothing?”
This paper explores soft power’s presence in and impact on international competi-
tion by providing statistically analyzed empirical evidence. Specifically, it analyzes the
process by which countries compete with one another for the privilege of hosting a
major global sporting event: the Olympic Summer or Winter Games. Even though 
the Olympics and international sports are an important field of global interaction
between political actors (Cottrell & Nelson, 2011), they remain underexamined from
the perspective of international relations (Cha, 2009). The importance of soft power
has been emphasized in the area of sports diplomacy (Cha, 2009; Chappelet, 2008;
Chappelet and Kubler-Mabbott, 2008; Houlihan, Bloyce, & Smith, 2009), but has not
yet been tested empirically.
The article is organized as follows. In the next section, the theoretical and historical
background of soft power and the selection of Olympic host cities are described. Factors
that can influence the International Olympic Committee (IOC)’s vote are presented in
a review of the relevant literature and of Olympics history. The third section explains
in detail the methodology used to operationalize the main concepts and construct
research hypotheses, and suggests models for analyzing the IOC’s voting patterns. The
fourth section analyses the results of panel data regressions. In the final section, factors
that had significant effects in the models are discussed and conclusions are drawn
regarding the impact of soft power on the Olympic bids, with a summary of the principal
findings.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
Soft Power: A Popular but Atheoretical Concept?
Soft power, a term coined two decades ago by Joseph Nye, is the ability of a country
to exert its influence on the actions of another through nonmilitary means such as 
persuasion or attraction rather than coercion (Nye, 1990). According to Nye (2008), a
country can wield power in three ways: threat of force (the stick), inducement with
payments (the carrot), or shaping the preferences of others to get them to want the
same outcomes. Nye (2004) envisioned a country’s soft power, as opposed to its hard
(military and economic) power, to be a new element of international politics following
the end of the Cold War. He pointed out that a country’s soft power rests primarily on
three sources: its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values
(when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are
seen as legitimate and having moral authority) (Nye, 2004, 2008). As a component of
soft power, culture means not only high culture like literature, art, and education,
which appeals to elites, but also television, cinema, pop music, and sports, consumed
in mass entertainment markets. Political values such as democracy, justice, equality,
and transparency strongly affect the people’s preferences. A country’s foreign policy
also affects its soft power since it influences the attitudes, perceptions, and images that
foreign citizens have of that country.
Although Nye’s arguments about the importance and role of soft power have had
an enormous impact on the theory and practice of global politics, this has taken place
without any real agreement as to what soft power actually means, precisely how it
works, and what it takes to deploy it effectively (Kroenig, McAdam, & Weber, 2010).
Thus, in order to attain a more rigorous theoretical position and be deployed as a tool
of evidence-based policy-making, the concept of soft power needs to be scrutinized
and transferred from the world of abstract theory to a practical, concrete, and grounded
reality. In other words, more historical and empirical evidence is required for soft
power’s proponents to back up their claims.
Nye (2004) proposed a “three-dimensional chessboard” model, which divides
world politics into three closely interdependent dimensions of influence: military at the
top, economic in the middle, and soft power at the bottom. However, is there any realm
of international relations in which soft power affects interactions—that is, collective
patterns of ideas and behaviors—between state and/or nonstate actors? Or, to follow the
hard-core realism proponents’ argument, is soft power an illusion? Do all competitions
between countries merely end up as zero-sum games in which the super-powerful
hegemon wins all? Is there really such a thing as soft power?
Faster, Higher, “Softly” Stronger 49
The Korean Journal of Policy Studies
In order to establish the existence of soft power and its impact on international
competition, both soft- and hard-power factors need to be included in an analytical
model, so that while one factor is controlled, the influence of the other can be estimated.
However, past research on hard and soft power, which used qualitative methods such
as case studies, often omitted one of the two variables from analysis, which might
threaten causal inference with confounding factors or spurious effects. This study is
one of the first attempts to capture both hard and soft power by employing quantitative
analysis. To investigate the explanatory power and concrete applicability of soft power
theory, the present study looks at the influence of soft power on the Olympic competi-
tion, which involves international politics (Hoffmann, Ging, & Ramasamy, 2002).
Soft Power and the Olympic Games Bids
The history of Olympic bidding, in which cities and countries compete to host the
largest global sporting event in the world, reveals clues to how a country’s soft power is
exerted. In the Olympic system (Chappelet & Kübler-Mabbott, 2008), the IOC allocates
exclusive rights to host the Olympics seven years in advance in a rigorous election
process that involves a series of votes by IOC members, in which the city with the
fewest votes is excluded until one achieves an absolute majority. Although the games
are officially awarded to a city (for example, Sochi, Russia, for the Winter Games of
2014 and Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, for the Summer Games of 2016), bidding to host the
Olympics is not merely a city affair, but also a fierce contest between bid cities’ home
countries, in which they deploy their hard and soft power. According to the Olympic
Charter (IOC, 2011b, pp. 72-73), “Should there be several potential applicant cities in
the same country to the same Olympic Games, one city only may apply, as decided by
the National Olympic Committee of the country concerned”; “the national government
of the country of any applicant city must submit to the IOC a legally binding instrument
by which the said government undertakes and guarantees that the country and its public
authorities will comply with and respect the Olympic Charter”. Therefore, this paper
focuses on the competition to host the Olympic Games at the country level.
Most scholarship on Olympic bidding success has been carried out using qualitative
methods such as case studies and anecdotal analyses (e.g., Carey, Mason, & Misener,
2011; Haugen, 2005; Merkel & Kim, 2012; Persson, 2002; Rowe, 2012; White, 2011);
only a limited number of quantitative studies have tried to investigate the determinants
of host city choices of the IOC (Feddersen, Maennig, & Zimmermann, 2008; Poast,
2007). Poast (2007) analyzed all Olympic bids between 1959 and 2005 using rank-
ordered conditional logit estimation. In his analysis, the IOC showed a statistical 
tendency to base its decision on the economic vitality of a bid city’s home country and
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on the need to maintain continental diversity. Feddersen et al. (2008) examined the
probability of success of cities’ bid campaigns by using quantified determinants for a
total of 48 bids for the Summer Olympic Games between 1992 and 2012. Using a
multivariate binary logistical regression, they found that the distance of sporting venues
from the Olympic Village, which most bid experts would consider as a secondary 
factor, as well as local temperature and the unemployment rate in the bidding city’s
home country were significant determinants in explaining the IOC’s decision. Although
these empirical studies have made a remarkable contribution to understanding the
determinants of Olympic bid winners, no research has yet been conducted on a theo-
retical framework. In order to bridge this scholarly gap between empirical work and
theoretical foundations, this study attempts to apply the soft power theory to the
Olympic bidding process.
On the basis of the existing literature and the theory of soft power, several hypotheti-
cal rationales could explain the IOC’s voting behavior with regard to a bid country’s
soft or hard power. First, one can hypothesize that if one bid country has more economic
power than the others, the IOC will vote for it due to the expected financial benefits 
in terms of television broadcasting rights and official Olympic sponsorships (Poast,
2007). After the commercially successful Los Angeles Olympics in 1984 and the chal-
lenging Centennial Games in Atlanta in 1996, the IOC realized that regional and
national governments must be more involved in the staging of the games, because
their size and cost has increased tremendously (Chappelet, 1996). This “Olympic
gigantism” and strong commercialization of the games can inhibit poor countries from
competing to host the games and favor the choice of countries that are rich enough to
cover the enormous expenditure and that have more profitable markets. Thus, countries
with larger economies or faster economic growth may use their substantial financial
resources as the “carrot” to win the vote.
Second, political rationales can also affect the IOC’s decision. The Cold War years,
during which sports was a vehicle to demonstrate the superiority of two confronting
ideologies, communism and capitalism, inevitably saw block voting by Western, 
Eastern, and Third World IOC members. In particular, the Eastern bloc tried to host
the Olympics and did so in Moscow in 1980 and Sarajevo, Yugoslavia, in 1984. It also
heavily protested the awarding of the 1988 games to Seoul in 1981. Other factors
included the long-running South African apartheid issue and boycotts brought about
by events such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (Toohey & Veal, 2007). However,
in the post-Cold War era, it is less likely that countries’ strong military power will
affect the IOC’s decision. For example, Chicago was eliminated in the first round of
voting for the 2016 games despite the presence of the US president on the day of the
vote.
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In contrast with these hard-power-related explanations, which are based on a model
of rational actors who are embedded within a country’s economic or political interests,
value-based rationales emphasize that the ideals of the Olympic movement (Olympism1)
can influence the IOC’s choice of host city, as Pierre de Coubertin, the founder of the
modern Olympics, once dreamed. Accordingly, it is critical for bid cities and countries
to obtain a high level of Olympic legitimacy in the eyes of IOC members by maintaining
the integrity of Olympic values.
For example, countries can contribute to the Olympic movement not only by 
participating in the Olympics and other sports events, but also by their athletes’ per-
formance in the games. Strong sports performance becomes a soft-power asset that
benefits the country, because a positive reputation in sports can cement a country’s
global status and position in world politics (Cha, 2009). Thus, a country’s sporting
success, roughly measured by the number of its Olympic gold medals, can be both
appreciated for its enhancement of the Olympic movement and exerted as an effective
lobbying influence in the field of international sports diplomacy. In particular, promotion
of the contributions of internationally recognized Olympic champions has been a widely
used strategy in the Olympic bid process. Therefore, if a country has a high number of
Olympic gold medalists, this could impress International Olympic Committee members
and influence their decisions. For instance, double Olympic champion Sebastian Coe
chaired the London 2012 bid committee.
The fundamental principles governing the Olympic system include transparency,
democracy, accountability, autonomy, and social responsibility (Chappelet and Kubler-
Mabbott, 2008). Thus, the Olympics always involve a deep interrogation of the ethical
worthiness of the hosts (Rowe, 2012, p. 288). In the context of soft power, a good
image and ethical reputation for adhering to the Olympic philosophy and principles
could persuade IOC members to vote in favor of a country. On the other hand, the IOC
could consider widespread corruption in the bidding country as a sign of administra-
tive inefficiency and political instability, because members of the national Olympic
organizing committee interact closely with governmental officials (Poast, 2007).
The IOC’s consideration of ethical issues appears to be reinforced by the more
transparent bid procedures that were adopted in 1999 and the revelation of the unethical
practices of the Salt Lake City 2002 bid committee. The old practice, in which each
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1. Olympism has been described as “a philosophy of life, exalting and combining in a balanced
whole the qualities of body, will and mind. Blending sport with culture and education,
Olympism seeks to create a way of life based on the joy of effort, the educational value of
good example, social responsibility and respect for universal fundamental ethical principles”
(IOC, 2011b, p.11).
bid candidate enticed as many IOC members as possible to visit the attractions of its
proposed Olympic sites and facilities, caused side effects involving excessive giving
of gifts and other enticements to IOC members and their families, which in turn led to
the lobbying crisis of 1998-1999 and subsequent reforms (Toohey & Veal, 2007). As a
consequence, the current IOC guidelines regulate contacts between candidates and
IOC members, including related organizations (see IOC, 2005). One might hypothesize
that these more transparent decision-making processes are likely to lead the IOC to
choose the host according to bidding countries’ transparency and ethical reputation.
Regarding ecological concerns, the IOC adopted the environment as the “third 
pillar” of the Olympic ideology in 1994 and adopted Agenda 21, a series of sustainable
development principles for the Olympic movement, five years later (Chappelet, 2008).
It also added a new, 13th mission to the Olympic Charter, seeking “to encourage and
support a responsible concern for environmental issues, to promote sustainable devel-
opment in sports and to require that the Olympic Games are held accordingly” (IOC,
2011b, p. 15). These new principles of environmental protection are not simply a sign
of the times but also a positive legacy of the Olympic Winter Games since the 1990s
(Chappelet, 2008). Thus, by aspiring to showcase the Green Games as an ecological
legacy of the Olympics, the IOC may prefer countries with a stronger environmental
record to those emitting harmful pollutants.
METHODOLOGY
Hypotheses, Data, and Measures
Based on the theoretical and historical background discussed above, the main
hypothesis of the study was constructed as follows: assuming that countries’ hard-
power factors are equal, their soft power can affect the result of bidding to host the
Olympic Games.
Another factor that the IOC appears to take into account, as earlier studies (Feddersen
et al., 2008; Poast, 2007) have pointed out, is the continental diversity of the host coun-
tries.2 The Olympic Summer Games have been held on different continents for each
consecutive Games since the 1952 Olympics in Helsinki, Finland (Feddersen et al.,
2008, p. 177) and this continental rotation has been also true of the Olympic Winter
Games since the 1968 Olympics in Grenoble, France. On only one occasion since 1968
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2. Five continents have continental associations of national Olympic committees, corresponding
to the five Olympic rings: Africa, America, Asia, Europe, and Oceania (IOC, 2011b, p. 9).
were the Winter Games awarded to countries on the same continent twice in a row: in
1992 and 1994 (Albertville, France, and Lillehammer, Norway) (Poast, 2007, p. 82).
As demonstrated in table 1, the Summer and Winter Games were never awarded to
the same continent twice in a row between 1990 and 2011. However, in the list of the
overall Olympics (both Summer and Winter), two exceptions can be found (Athens
2004 and Turin 2006, London 2012 and Sochi 2014). Thus, it is hypothesized that
continental rotation affects the IOC’s choice of host city.
Figure 1 illustrates the analytical framework used to estimate the key factors affecting
the choice of Olympic host cities.
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Table 1. Continental Location of Olympic Games Host Cities, 1990-2011
Olympics Year chosen Year held Host country Host city Continent
1990 1996 United States Atlanta America
1993 2000 Australia Sydney Oceania
Summer Games
1997 2004 Greece Athens Europe
2001 2008 China Beijing Asia
2005 2012 United Kingdom London Europe
2009 2016 Brazil Rio de Janeiro America
1991 1998 Japan Nagano Asia
1995 2002 United States Salt Lake City America
Winter Games
1999 2006 Italy Turin Europe
2003 2010 Canada Vancouver America
2007 2014 Russia Sochi Europe
2011 2018 Korea PyeongChang Asia
Source: IOC (2011a).
Figure 1. Influence of Key Factors on Olympic Games Bid Results
Therefore, this study proposed three research hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: A country’s hard power has a significant impact on the result of
its bid to host the Olympic Games.
Hypothesis 2: A country’s soft power has a significant impact on the result of
its bid to host the Olympic Games.
Hypothesis 3: The continental rotation rule has a significant impact on the result
of its bid to host the Olympic Games.
To test the hypotheses, quantitative methods were employed, because large-n studies
of the IOC’s host city selections can identify systematic tendencies (Poast, 2007, p. 76)
and provide statistically generalized statements concerning the relationships between a
country’s soft power and the choices made by the IOC.
The data set was constructed from all bidding countries for the Olympic Summer
and Winter Games in the post-Cold-War era (between 1990, the first bidding year after
the 1989 fall of the Berlin Wall, and 2011). Thus, the estimates are based on a total of
86 bidding cities/countries, consisting of 48 Summer Games and 38 Winter Games
bids. An overview of the bid countries and selected cities for each Olympic Games is
provided in the Appendix.
Hard power is relatively easy to measure in terms of a country’s military and eco-
nomic power, as originally defined by Nye (1990). However, soft power is an intangible
and multidimensional concept that is inherently difficult to quantify. Furthermore, its
relational nature makes cross-national comparisons difficult, because the perceptions
of one country may vary substantially from those of another (McClory, 2010). Several
pioneering works have measured countries’ soft power by creating composite indexes
of attributes or resources. For instance, Whitney and Shambaugh (2008) produced an
index to measure five domains of soft power—economic, cultural, diplomatic, human
capital, and political—using a questionnaire that surveyed respondents in China, Japan,
Korea, Vietnam, Indonesia, and the United States.
McClory (2010) also developed an index, which used a mixture of objective and
subjective indicators to measure 26 countries’ soft power across five categories (busi-
ness/innovation, culture, government, diplomacy, and education). These suggest that
soft power can be measured using both subjective indicators, employing survey methods
to directly investigate people’s perceptions or opinions of a country’s image or reputation
(soft data), and objective indicators, making use of officially published administrative
data (hard data).
This study measured countries’ soft power over the IOC mainly using objective
indicators provided by international organizations such as the World Bank, for two
reasons. First, although time-series survey data on each country after the Cold War
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period are needed for the current study, IOC members’ perceptions of candidate coun-
tries have never been measured by longitudinal survey methods (lack of data avail-
ability). Second, official data measured by international standards can facilitate cross-
country comparison, which may avoid the “subjectivity” limitations of survey methods
based on individual perceptions (greater data credibility).
Based on Nye (2004)’s main constituent pillars of culture, political values, and 
foreign policy, this study assesses a country’s soft power over the IOC across three
dimensions, with a particular focus on the characteristics of the field of sports, because
soft power depends on context, as Nye stressed. First, a country’s sporting success, as
represented by national results in the Olympic Games, could be recognized by the
IOC. For example, world-popular sports stars who have won gold medals in the
Olympics could influence IOC members’ decision-making concerning host country
selection. Second, the ethical dimension of soft power can be defined by relying on the
argument that it is exercised “when a country’s culture includes universal values and
its policies promote values and interests that others share” (Nye, 2004, p. 11). It could
thus be hypothesized that a nation’s ethical image is likely to persuade the IOC to
choose it as the rightful host country. Third, a country’s environmental sustainability
could be regarded as a desirable value by the IOC, which seeks to host environmentally
friendly Olympics. The more efforts a country makes to protect the environment, the
more attractive it is to the IOC.
Models, Variables, and Analytical Methods
Like two sides of a coin, the impact of a country’s soft power on its Olympic bid
depends on the extent to which the IOC prefers a candidate country to have more soft
power. Which countries are more likely to be preferred by the IOC as the host venue
in terms of their soft or hard power?
It is hard to predict how IOC members will vote, as voting is by secret ballot (Persson,
2002, p. 27). In addition, they are well known for voting on the basis of political and 
personal judgment (Chappelet & Kubler-Mabbott, 2008, p. 87). However, past voting
results of the IOC provide clues that enable estimation of members’ preferred host coun-
tries in terms of hard and soft power, assuming that not all voting members of the IOC
are irrational, emotional, or corrupt. The few bribery cases in Olympic history (particu-
larly the lobbying crisis of 1998-1999) do not prove that all IOC members engage in 
corrupt transactions of votes with lobbyists. It is more reasonable to assume that most
members of the IOC vote based on their own beliefs or systems of preferences.
In this respect, this study made several assumptions regarding the IOC’s preferences
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and voting behaviors in order to construct estimation models. In line with revealed
preference theory, which has been developed since Samuelson’s (1938) seminal paper,
the IOC’s unobserved preferences are assumed to be revealed by their observed voting
results, and their voting behaviors regarding host city choice are assumed to be rational
and consistent. Figure 2 illustrates a model of the IOC’s host country selection in
which members vote for candidate countries whose combinations of hard and soft
power they prefer.
Regarding the dependent variable, the IOC’s preferences for Olympic hosts were
measured in three ways in order to ensure the robustness of the analysis. First, host
success is a dummy variable that represents the IOC’s final decision, assigning the
value of 1 if a country is chosen as host and 0 if not. Second, IOC rank represents the
IOC’s ranking of the bidding countries in the year t. For convenience of interpretation,
the reciprocal value of the variable is used. Third, IOC votes measures how many
votes a candidate country obtained in all bidding rounds in a given year t. The IOC’s
preference is assumed to be reflected in the number of votes a country gets, as calcu-
lated by the ratio of individual members’ votes to overall votes in a year t. The values
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Figure 2. A model of the IOC’s host country selection
Note: Indifference curve is a graph showing different combinations of bid countries’ hard and soft power which render
indifferent or the same level of utility (satisfaction) for the IOC’s choices of host countries. That is, at each point on
the curve, the IOC has no preference for one country over another.
of these variables are shown in the Appendix.
The independent variables associated with soft power are defined in ethical, environ-
mental, and sporting dimensions. Transparency represents a country’s soft power in
terms of ethics. Poast (2007) and Feddersen et al. (2008) state that this can be measured
by the Corruption Perceptions Index produced by Transparency International; this
ranges from 0 to 10, with 0 indicating a country with an extremely and pervasively
corrupt government, and 10 indicating the opposite. The environmental sustainability
of each country is measured by two environmental indexes: CO2 emissions and particle
emissions measure a country’s production of air pollutants such as CO2 (Carbon dioxide)
and PM10 (per cubic meter 10 or particles less than 10 microns in diameter) per GDP.
These data were collected from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.
Sporting success refers to the number of gold medals won in the previous Summer and
Winter Olympic Games.
To measure hard-power factors, GDP and GDP growth were included in the models
to represent a country’s overall economic performance and emerging economic trends,
and military expenditure was used as a proxy for military power. In addition, the esti-
mation models included continental rotation as a dummy variable, assigning the value
of 1 if a bidding country is located on a different continent from the host country of the
next upcoming Summer and Winter Olympics, and 0 if it is on the same continent.
Therefore, the following econometric model was proposed:
Preferences for host (host success, IOC rank, IOC votes)it = β0 + β1 sporting
successit + β2 transparencyit-1 + β3 CO2 emissionsit-1 + β4 particle emissionsit-1 +
β5 GDPit-1 + β6 GDP growthit-1 + β7 military expenditureit-1 + β8 continental
rotationit + εit
To clarify, i denotes each bidding country for t, which is the year of the IOC vote.
Several soft- and hard-power-related variables receive values from the year prior to the
vote (t-1), on the assumption that the IOC’s decisions are based on candidate coun-
tries’ status during the previous year. Table 2 summarizes all variables used in the
models, and table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for all variables and correlations
between them.
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Table 2. Variables Used in the Models
Name Measure Data source
Dependent variables
Host success Final decision on the host site (dummy) International Olympic Committee
IOC rank Bid’s ranking by the IOC (reciprocal) International Olympic Committee
IOC votes Ratio of votes that a bid country gets to overall votes International Olympic Committee
Independent variables
Sporting success Number of gold medals won in the last Summer and International Olympic CommitteeWinter Games
Transparency Perceived government corruption in the previous year Corruption Perceptions Indexto the bid (scale of 0 to 10)
CO2 emissions
Emitted carbon dioxide per GDP in the previous year World Development Indicatorsto the bid
Particle emissions Emitted PM10 per GDP in the previous year to the bid World Development Indicators
GDP Real GDP (PPP, constant 2005 $) in the previous year World Development Indicatorsto the bid
GDP growth Growth rate (%) of real GDP (PPP, constant 2005 $) World Development Indicatorsin the previous year to the bid
Military expenditure Military expenditure ($) in the previous year to the bid World Development Indicators
Continental Different continental location from the host country of International Olympic Committeerotation the next upcoming Summer/Winter Olympics (dummy)
Note: Several imputations were conducted for absent values for transparency (due to the Corruption Perceptions Index
not being published before 1995).
GDP = gross domestic product; PPP = purchasing power parity.
Table 3. Summary Statistics and Pearson’s Correlations
Host success 86 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00
IOC rank 86 0.34 0.30 0.09 1.00
IOC votes 86 0.14 0.18 0.00 0.66
Continental 
rotation 86 0.43 0.50 0.00 1.00
GDP 82 1.57e+12 2.41e+12 1.72e+10 1.32e+13
GDP growth 86 4.11 4.11 -12.57 25.48 -0.14
Military 
expenditure 81 4.81e+10 1.08e+11 7.38e+08 5.75e+11 0.95 -0.13
Sporting 
success 86 10.91 13.03 0.00 56.00 0.71 -0.30 0.69
Transparency 82 5.80 2.31 1.90 9.60 0.18 -0.26 0.16 0.00
CO2
emissions 81 0.49 0.31 0.16 1.73 0.02 0.19 0.08 0.33 -0.41
Particle 
emissions 85 33.87 20.31 12.45 124.84 -0.10 0.32 -0.11 -0.13 -0.49 0.23
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In order to estimate the proposed econometric models, and given the panel nature
of the data and characteristics of the dependent variables, the time-series cross-national
aggregate level data sets were grouped by overall and summer/winter periods and
regressed individually by a variety of panel data regression methods, including panel
logit/probit models (against the dependent variable host success), fixed-effects and
random-effects models (against IOC rank and IOC vote). These panel regression
methods can rule out the omitted variable bias caused by unobserved characteristics of
individual countries (Baltagi, 2008; Cameron & Trivedi, 2009; Wooldridge, 2002).
For instance, with the fixed-effects model, the effects of unobservable factors such as a
bid country’s lobbying strategies can be eliminated if these are assumed to be country-
specific and time-invariant. In addition, the Hausman (1978) specification test was
performed to choose a data-corresponding model from the fixed- and random-effects
models.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Descriptive Analysis
Table 4 illustrates the hard- and soft-power-related indicators (from the year prior
to the bidding) of all Olympic host countries between 1990 and 2011. In terms of GDP
and military expenditure, the United States was the largest host and Greece the smallest;
China had the fastest GDP growth and Australia the slowest. In terms of sporting 
success, the United States won the most Olympic gold medals and Brazil the fewest.
With respect to the level of transparency, Canada had the highest and Russia the lowest
score. Regarding environmental efforts, the best records were held by Brazil (for CO2
emissions) and the United Kingdom (for particle emissions), while China emitted the
most of both pollutants.
Next, in order to compare the hard and soft power of countries with successful and
unsuccessful bids, all related variable values were standardized with each variable’s
mean and variance being 0 and 1 (z-transformation). Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the pat-
terns of the Olympic host countries’ hard and soft power based on these standardized
values. With regard to hard power, most Olympic host countries had relatively low
levels among all bidding countries between 1990 and 2011 (with the exception of the
United States and China). However, the Olympic host countries had higher levels of
soft power compared with their levels of hard power.
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Table 4. Olympic Host Countries’ Hard and Soft Power (1990-2011)
Year Year 
Host country Host city GDP
Military GDP Sporting
Transparency
CO2 Particle 
chosen held expenditure growth success emissions emissions
1990 1996 United States Atlanta 7,820 437 3.56 38 7.79 0.63 30.35
1991 1998 Japan Nagano 3,230 29 5.57 4 6.72 0.36 42.18
1993 2000 Australia Sydney 410 9 0.58 7 8.8 0.72 20.58
1995 2002 United States Salt Lake City 8,800 363 4.11 43 7.79 0.59 27.44
1997 2004 Greece Athens 193 6 2.36 4 5.01 0.42 53.15
1999 2006 Italy Turin 1,500 29 1.40 15 4.6 0.29 33.45
2001 2008 China Beijing 3,370 63 8.40 28 3.1 1.01 85.46
2003 2010 Canada Vancouver 1,050 12 2.92 10 9 0.50 20.10
2005 2012 United Kingdom London 1,930 47 2.95 10 8.6 0.28 14.58
2007 2014 Russia Sochi 1,840 66 8.15 35 2.5 0.85 17.36
2009 2016 Brazil Rio de Janeiro 1,840 28 5.16 3 3.7 0.21 20.83
2011 2018 Korea PyeongChang 1,320 36 6.16 19 5.4 0.45 25.42
Average of all bidding countries 1,570 48 4.11 10.91 5.83 0.49 33.87
Note: Numbers for GDP and military expenditure represent billions of dollars.
Figure 3. Patterns of Olympic Host Countries’ Hard Power (1990-2011)
Note: Values for each variable were standardized as z-scores and displayed on the vertical axis. In order to be directionally consistent with
the other indicators, values of CO2 and particle (PM10) emissions were reversed with opposite signs.
Multivariate Analysis
Table 5 presents the results of the multivariate analysis. First, in all Olympic
Games bids between 1990 and 2011, the significant independent variables were trans-
parency and GDP growth, at around 10 percent significance level (in the model with
the dependent variable of IOC rank), sporting success and particle emissions, below
the 10 percent significance level (in the IOC votes model), and continental rotation at
the 5 percent significance level (in the host success model). Second, in Summer
Games bids from 1990-2009, particle emissions was negative and significant below
the 10 percent significance level in the IOC votes model, while continental rotation
was positively significant for host success. Third, in Winter Games bids from 1991-
2011, most variables (except transparency) associated with soft power, such as CO2
emissions, particle emissions, and sporting success, as well as hard-power-related
GDP growth, were significant below the 10 percent and 5 percent significance levels
in the IOC rank and IOC votes models. Continental rotation was positively significant
below the 10 percent significance level in the host success model.
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Figure 4. Patterns of Olympic Host Countries’ Soft Power (1990-2011)
Note: Values for each variable were standardized as z-scores and displayed on the vertical axis. In order to be directionally consistent with
the other indicators, values of CO2 and particle (PM10) emissions were reversed with opposite signs.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
According to the results of the analysis, all soft-power-related variables had a 
statistically significant impact on the bid results, supporting the main hypothesis of
this paper that the host country’s soft power can be a strong factor in winning an
Olympic bid. For instance, the United Kingdom (for the 2012 Olympics) and Canada
(for 2010) had the highest values for transparency of all competitors.
In contrast, as components of countries’ hard power, military expenditure was not
significant at all in any model, and GDP paradoxically had no significant effect on the
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Table 5. Panel Regression Results for Olympic Games Bids
All bids, 1990-2011 Summer bids, 1990-2009 Winter bids, 1991-2011
Model
Panel Panel Fixed Random Fixed Random Panel Fixed Fixed Panel Random Random 
logit probit effects effects effects effects probit effects effects logit effects effects
Dependent Host Host IOC IOC IOC IOC Host IOC IOC Host IOC IOC 
variables success success rank rank votes votes success rank votes success rank votes
Independent Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
variables (z-stat) (z-stat) (t-stat) (z-stat) (t-stat) (z-stat) (z-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (z-stat) (z-stat) (z-stat)
GDP
0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.77) (0.75) (-0.78) (0.60) (-0.41) (0.60) (-0.23) (-1.58) (-1.17) (1.55) (1.57) (0.57)
GDP growth
0.10 0.05 0.03* 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.27 0.04** 0.03**
(1.29) (1.21) (1.66) (1.06) (1.51) (1.07) (-0.05) (-0.42) (-0.50) (1.16) (2.30) (2.41)
Military -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
expenditure (-0.76) (-0.76) (-0.65) (-0.57) (-1.28) (-0.68) (0.31) (0.00) (-0.08) (-1.43) (-1.43) (-0.48)
Sporting 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00* 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.08 0.01** 0.01**
success (1.48) (1.45) (0.65) (1.42) (0.74) (1.79) (0.55) (0.96) (0.50) (0.93) (2.05) (2.50)
Transparency
0.13 0.07 0.09 0.03* 0.02 0.15 0.10 0.04 -0.17 0.01 0.00
(0.68) (0.63) (1.20) (1.84) (1.62) (0.98) (0.86) (0.76) (-0.45) (0.34) (0.10)
CO2 -0.34 -0.26 -0.17 -0.02 0.21 -0.17 -0.24 0.11 -0.99 -0.31 -0.29**
emissions (-0.20) (-0.30) (-0.31) (-0.12) (0.69) (-0.15) (-0.36) (0.31) (-0.31) (-1.55) (-2.05)
Particle -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01* 0.00 0.01 -0.03* -0.01* -0.08 -0.01** -0.00*
emissions (-0.22) (-0.28) (-1.22) (0.22) (-1.76) (0.66) (0.50) (-2.08) (-2.07) (-1.49) (-2.32) (-1.86)
Continental 1.88** 1.00** 0.09 0.09 -0.02 0.02 1.16* -0.08 -0.09 2.78* 0.15 0.05
rotation (2.29) (2.34) (0.94) (1.33) (-0.35) (0.42) (1.71) (-0.44) (-0.98) (1.71) (1.48) (0.74)
Constant
-4.69** -2.53** 0.35 -0.01 0.43* -0.07 -3.10** 1.22 0.53 -2.65 0.35 0.19
(-2.30) (-2.35) (0.49) (-0.07) (1.79) (-0.65) (-1.99) (1.13) (0.95) (-0.63) (1.22) (0.91)
N 81 81 81 81 81 81 44 44 44 37 37 37
Note: Due to missing values, regressions excluded five observations: Yugoslavia (1996), Puerto Rico (2004), Cuba (2008, 2012), and Andorra (2010).
* significance at around 10% level; ** significance at around 5% level
success of bids. This result makes sense when we consider that the United States and
China, although superpowers, have not always won their bids. For instance, as demon-
strated in figure 5, China (with a larger GDP) lost the 2000 Olympics to Australia,
whose soft power was much higher than China’s (with the exception of sporting success
measured by the number of gold medals won in the 1992 Summer and 1992 Winter
Olympics). In fact, Sydney appeared to be the city that best manifested the three 
elements of Olympism: sports, culture, and the environment (White, 2011, p. 1451).
However, the IOC has also preferred, in the past, countries with better economic
performance in terms of GDP growth rate. The economic considerations of the IOC
include a candidate’s financial ability to stage the games, and monetary profitability
from the potential host market. As shown in figure 6, countries with emerging markets—
such as China (for the 2008 Olympics), Russia (for 2014), and Brazil (for 2016)—
have recently been chosen by the IOC. Interestingly, China and Russia had high sport-
ing power while Brazil had low emissions, which can be interpreted as indicating the
importance of soft power. This suggests that hard power alone (GDP, GDP growth
rate, and military expenditure) is not sufficient to win an Olympic bid. In this regard,
Nye (2008) went one step further and argued for the need to deploy “smart power,”
which is the ability to combine hard and soft power effectively. For example, China’s
bid campaign linked economic development to Olympism (Haugen, 2005), and Brazil
used media strategies that framed the bid with Olympic-related developments (Carey
et al., 2011).
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Figure 5. Hard and Soft Power of China and Australia (for the 2000 Olympic Bid)
Note: Values for each variable were standardized as z-scores and displayed on each axis. In order to be directionally consis-
tent with the other indicators, values of CO2 and particle (PM10) emissions were reversed with opposite signs.
The continental rotation variable (which represents the goal of not hosting the
Olympics on the same continent twice in a row) contributed substantially to host 
success. This means that the IOC tends not to choose countries from the same continent
for two Games in a row. For instance, in July 2003, when deciding on the host country
of the 2010 Winter Olympic Games, IOC members considered that the next games
were to be held in Europe (Athens in 2004 and Turin in 2006) and Asia (China in
2008), which influenced the decision to award the 2010 Winter Olympics to the city of
Vancouver in Canada (Slack & Parent, 2006, p. 258).
Therefore, it can be concluded that IOC members have taken the principle of
continental rotation into account in their decision-making, despite the fact that it is
not an official rule but an informal consensus.3 Therefore, countries need to time their
bids appropriately to appeal to the IOC’s continental rotation rule, or to the spirit of
Olympism and the legitimacy of spreading the Olympic movement and the games
throughout as many regions of the world as possible. For instance, a main selling point
of Rio de Janeiro’s bid was that the Summer Games had never been held in South
America (although they were held many times in North America, including Mexico in
1968).
The rotation principle is best illustrated by the successful bid of PyeongChang in
Korea, which had been defeated in two consecutive Olympic Winter Games bids, by
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3. Based on Nye’s (2004) argument that even nonstate actors such as international organiza-
tions frequently wield soft power, it could be argued that the IOC enhances its legitimacy
by following the continental rotation rule, thus increasing its soft-power influence.
Figure 6. Hard and Soft Power of China (for 2008), Russia (for 2014), and Brazil (for 2016)
Note: Values for each variable were standardized as z-scores and displayed on each axis. In order to be directionally consis-
tent with the other indicators, values of CO2 and particle (PM10) emissions were reversed with opposite signs.
Vancouver for 2010 and Sochi for 2014. In its 2011 bid for the 2018 Winter Games,
the Korean bid committee used the slogan New Horizons to acquire Olympic legitimacy
in the eyes of the IOC, and emphasized its Drive the Dream Projects, in which the
Korean government supported winter sports in developing/emerging countries
(Merkel & Kim, 2012). This strategy appealed to the IOC by suggesting that the 2018
Winter Games should be hosted in Asia, not in Europe (two key competitors were
France and Germany).4 Figure 7 illustrates the impact of continental rotation on the
results of Korea’s bid to host the 2010, 2014, and 2018 Winter Games. In contrast with
66 Faster, Higher, “Softly” Stronger
The Korean Journal of Policy Studies
Figure 7. Effect of the Continental Rotation Principle on Korea’s Olympic Bids
Note: Values for each variable were standardized as z-scores and displayed on each axis. In order to be directionally consis-
tent with the other indicators, values of CO2 and particle (PM10) emissions were reversed with opposite signs.
4. This strategy was enhanced when Yu-Na Kim, the 2010 Winter Olympic gold medalist in
figure skating, participated in the final phase of the bid process and told the IOC that staging
the Winter Olympics in Korea would be her personal dream come true and would inspire
young athletes in Korea and the Asian region, where winter sports are not as developed as
in Europe and North America (Lee, 2011). Another contender, Munich, Germany, also had
a figure skater, double Olympic champion Katarina Witt, as the chairperson of its organiz-
ing committee, indicating the important lobbying role of popular sports stars. Korea’s win
over Germany sheds light on the interaction of the continental rotation rule with a country’s
sporting success—wielding soft power via “message” coupled with “messenger” (Nye,
2004). A receiver’s behavior can be changed when both the content of the message and the
sender are tailored to appeal to the receiver (Sohn, 2011, p. 80).
the country’s 2010 and 2014 bids, for which continental rotation was not a supporting
factor, only Korea benefited from this principle in the bidding for 2018.
In conclusion, this study suggests that soft power is effective in long-term partic-
ipation in international cooperative systems such as the Olympics. These conclusions
should be interpreted cautiously because of several statistically weak results at the
conventional significance level, presumably due to the relatively small sample size.
Nevertheless, it is significant that the directions of signs were consistent in all models.
In general, soft-power factors were more important than hard-power factors: among
the latter, the only significant factor was GDP growth rate, whereas all soft-power-
related variables had significant impacts on bid success between 1990 and 2011. The
continental rotation rule also affected IOC decision-making, by both constraining a
“hard power takes all” approach and facilitating bid countries’ soft-power persuasion
strategies.
The empirical results of this study have several implications regarding the impact
of soft power on the choice of Olympic host city. First, a high number of Olympic
medals won by world-popular athletes can attract IOC members in favor of a country’s
bid. Second, a country’s ethical reputation is likely to persuade the IOC to choose it as
the rightful host country. Third, the environmental efforts of a country may also be
regarded as a desirable value by IOC members, who prefer a ‘Green Games’ ecological
legacy.
Therefore, the well-known Olympic motto of citius, altius, fotius (faster, higher,
stronger), which refers to athletic competition, can also refer to the competition between
countries to host the games, with a slight modification: faster (in economic growth),
higher (in Olympic legitimacy), and “softly” stronger (in soft power).
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APPENDIX: INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE VOTES
Year Round IOC
of bid Winning bid Bid countries 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th rank IOC votes
2011 2018 Winter Korea 63 1 0.663157895
PyeongChang, Korea Germany 25 2 0.263157895
France 7 3 0.073684211
2009 2016 Summer Brazil 26 46 66 1 0.480836237
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil Spain 28 29 32 2 0.31010453
Japan 22 20 – 3 0.146341463
United States 18 – – 4 0.06271777
Azerbaijan 7 0
Qatar 7 0
Czech Republic 7 0
2007 2014 Winter Russia 34 51 1 0.440414508
Sochi, Russia Korea 36 47 2 0.430051813
Austria 25 – 3 0.129533679
Kazakhstan 7 0
Georgia 7 0
Spain 7 0
Bulgaria 7 0
2005 2012 Summer United Kingdom 22 27 39 54 1 0.351485149
London, France 21 25 33 50 2 0.319306931
United Kingdom Spain 20 32 31 – 3 0.205445545
United States 19 16 – – 4 0.086633663
Russia 15 – – – 5 0.037128713
Germany 9 0
Brazil 9 0
Turkey 9 0
Cuba 9 0
2003 2010 Winter Canada 40 56 1 0.444444444
Vancouver, Canada Korea 51 53 2 0.481481481
Austria 16 – 3 0.074074074
Andorra 8 0
Switzerland 8 0
China 8 0
Spain 8 0
Bosnia-Herzegovina 8 0
2001 2008 Summer China 44 56 1 0.483091787
Beijing, China Canada 20 22 2 0.202898551
France 15 18 3 0.15942029
Turkey 17 9 4 0.125603865
Japan 6 – 5 0.028985507
Thailand 10 0
Egypt 10 0
Cuba 10 0
Malaysia 10 0
Spain 10 0
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1999 2006 Winter Italy 53 1 0.595505618
Turin, Italy Switzerland 36 2 0.404494382
Finland – 6 0
Austria – 6 0
Slovakia – 6 0
Poland – 6 0
1997 2004 Summer Greece 32 38 52 66 1 0.439252336
Athens, Greece Italy 23 28 35 41 2 0.296728972
South Africa 16 62 22 20 – 3 0.135514019
Sweden 20 19 – – 4 0.091121495
Argentina 16 44 – – – 5 0.037383178
Turkey 11 0
France 11 0
Brazil 11 0
Russia 11 0
Puerto Rico 11 0
Spain 11 0
1995 2002 Winter United States 54 1 0.606741573
Salt Lake City, USA Sweden 14 2 0.157303371
Switzerland 14 3 0.157303371
Canada 7 4 0.078651685
Austria 9 0
Spain 9 0
Slovakia 9 0
Russia 9 0
Italy 9 0
1993 2000 Summer Australia 30 30 37 45 1 0.401129944
Sydney, Australia China 32 37 40 43 2 0.429378531
United Kingdom 11 13 11 – 3 0.098870056
Germany 9 9 – – 4 0.050847458
Turkey 7 – – – 5 0.019774011
1991 1998 Winter Japan 21 30 36 46 1 0.378917379
Nagano, Japan United States 15 59 27 29 42 2 0.321937322
Sweden 18 25 23 – 3 0.188034188
Spain 19 5 – – 4 0.068376068
Italy 15 29 – – – 5 0.042735043
1990 1996 Summer United States 19 20 26 34 51 1 0.348837209
Atlanta, USA Greece 23 23 26 30 35 2 0.318604651
Canada 14 17 18 22 – 3 0.165116279
Australia 12 21 16 – – 4 0.113953488
United Kingdom 11 5 – – – 5 0.037209302
Yugoslavia 7 – – – – 6 0.01627907
Sources: IOC (2011a) and authors’ calculations.
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